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Exploring the connections between Philosophy for Children and character 








In this paper we are interested in the connections between Philosophy for Children 
and character education. In sketching these connections we suggest some areas 
where the relationship is potentially fruitful, particularly in light of research which 
suggests that in practice schools and teachers often adopt and mix different 
approaches to values education. We outline some implications of drawing 
connections between the two fields for moral education. The arguments made in this 
article are done so in the hope of encouraging further critical reflection on the 
potential relationship between Philosophy for Children and character education. 
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Introduction 
Superficially understood Philosophy for Children and character education may seem 
essentially different in nature and approach. Whilst the former may be associated 
with developing critical, free and autonomous thinkers, the latter has sometimes 
been seen (at least by its critics) as a mechanism for conformity. According to one 
leading critique, character education constitutes a ‘morality of compliance’ (Nash 
1997, p. 30). The view that character education is overly paternalistic is echoed by 
Tainlong Yu in his critique of the field. Yu (2004, p. 2) argues that ‘the construction of 
virtues is always tied to privilege, power, and control’. In these criticisms both Nash 
and Yu imply that character education might be somewhat undemocratic, requiring 
students to conform and comply rather than to think and act autonomously. Yet a 
more detailed and sophisticated consideration of both fields recognises that both 
Philosophy for Children and character education  Journal of Philosophy in Schools 2(2) 
49 
fields seek some sort of balance and relationship between critical, autonomous 
thinking and the development of virtues as a participating member of one’s 
communities. While there have been some analyses which have sought to explore 
the connections between philosophy for children and character education (see, for 
example, Sprod 2001), there is a need for further explorations given recent research 
in both fields pointing to their respective positive outcomes for students (Arthur, 
Kristjánsson, Walker, Sanderse, Jones, Thoma, Curran & Roberts 2015; Fair, Haas, 
Gardosik, Johnson, Price & Leipnik 2015; Gorard, Siddiqui & Huat See 2015) and 
recent work in character education focusing on intellectual or epistemic virtues 
(Baehr 2013a, 2013b; Kotzee 2013; Pritchard 2013). Moreover, we are interested in 
findings from empirical research which suggest that, in the practical approaches 
adopted within schools, distinctions between the two approaches often become 
complex and blurred. That is, when adopting pedagogical choices, teachers are likely 
(whether consciously or not) to fluidly move between different approaches to moral 
education, as illustrated for example in the Values Education in Australian Schools 
project undertaken in Australia in the 2000s (Department for Education, Science and 
Training 2003; Education Services Australia 2010). Whilst this does not mean that the 
differences between particular fields of moral education are unimportant, it does 
suggest value in exploring areas of potential synergy. Our aim here, then, is to set 
out some pertinent connections between the two fields, which we believe are fruitful 
areas for further investigation and reflection, and to draw some tentative 
implications of these for moral education. Of course, there is not scope in the 
confines of one paper for us to enter into the sort of depth regarding each of these 
that we would want, and so we make the arguments here in the hope that they will 
provoke critical debate from others and with the intention of expanding on key 
elements in more detail in the future. 
Before we commence the analysis it is important to set out—briefly—our working 
definitions of both character education and Philosophy for Children. We take our 
definition of character education from that employed by the Jubilee Centre for 
Character and Values at the University of Birmingham (2015) which defines 
character as ‘a set of personal traits or dispositions that produce specific moral 
emotions, inform motivation and guide conduct’ and character education as ‘an 
umbrella term for all explicit and implicit educational activities that help young 
people develop positive personal strengths called virtues’ (p. 2). We would dismiss 
standpoints which view character education as necessarily concerned with 
compliance and conformity, and concur with Kristján Kristánsson’s recent 
suggestion that such readings are merely a ‘myth’. According to Kristánsson: 
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Aristotle’s stringent condition about the eventual moral worth of virtuous 
activity—echoed by most contemporary character educationalists—serves to 
defuse the myth that character education is essentially anti-intellectual and 
anti-democratic. For if it is, it is not really character education on the Aristotelian 
understanding at all, but rather character conditioning. If the complaint is, 
rather, that some particular programmes of character education—for instance, 
as practised in the USA in the 1990s—were delivered in an anti-intellectual and 
anti-democratic way, then this may well be the case. But so much the worse for 
those programmes and the students who were at the receiving end of them, 
rather than for character education as such. (Kristjánsson 2013, p. 278) 
We understand Philosophy for Children as an approach to learning built around 
children’s developing philosophical questioning, thinking and reasoning capacities 
through engaging in structured communities of inquiry. Students’ emotional and 
moral development is also a central element of Philosophy for Children. Indeed, 
many of the leading contemporary writers in the field of Philosophy for Children 
have viewed the development of capacities such as care and empathy as central to its 
practice (Gregory 2000; Lipman 1995; Pritchard 1993; Schertz 2007). Schertz’ (2007, p. 
192) position is illustrative. In relation to developing students’ empathy, for 
example, he argues that the community of inquiry approach within Philosophy for 
Children ‘provides a peer-mediated educational encounter that fosters the 
development of empathy through polyphonic discourse, inquiry-based inductions 
and the sharing of affective states’. That Philosophy for Children is interested in 
cognitive development as well as emotional and moral development is also 
demonstrated in many of the programme initiatives which support the development 
of philosophy in schools. For example, Philosophy for Children New Zealand  define the 
field as ‘more than a thinking skills programme … It encourages intellectual courage 
and rigor and helps to develop the qualities that make for good judgment in everyday 
life’ (Philosophy for Children New Zealand n.d.-b, emphasis added). In addition, the 
internationally significant Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and 
Reflection in Education (known commonly and hereafter as SAPERE) identifies, as one 
of the two key principles of Philosophy for Children, that reflection is a ‘key practice 
that results in significant changes of thought and action’ (www.sapere.org.uk). 
It could be argued, of course, that the sorts of capacities to which we have given 
emphasis here—namely, good judgement or the relationship between thought and 
action—should be properly conceived as purely cognitive in nature. A leading 
example of this understanding of morality is provided by the Kantian tradition and 
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its clear separation between morality (which is based on and derives from duty and 
reason) and emotions (which according to Kant have no place in morality) (for a 
clear overview of the Kantian position in relation to moral education see, for 
example, Moran 2009; Sprod 2001; Surprenant 2010). While maintaining the central 
role of cognition within students’ moral learning, we argue here that moral 
development requires more than the development of reason, and should also be 
concerned with the affective and active domains. Indeed, it is the recognition of the 
importance of developing cognition, affection and action that lies at the heart of 
possible areas of confluence between Philosophy for Children and character 
education that we explore throughout the present analysis. 
Following this introduction we commence our analysis with a general overview of 
the two fields. Next, we seek to explore connections between Philosophy for 
Children and character education in two ways: (i) through highlighting the integral 
role that cultivating the intellect plays within character education, drawing links to 
the centrality of thinking skills within Philosophy of Education; and, (ii) through 
highlighting the place of moral judgement and action within Philosophy for 
Children, drawing links to the centrality of these within character education. In the 
final section we draw some starting points for further considerations regarding the 
implications for practice in moral education. 
 
Philosophy for Children and character education: Some initial framing 
Philosophy for Children 
Growing out of the work of Matthew Lipman in the US during the 1970s, Philosophy 
for Children has developed into a large and diverse field. Central to Matthew 
Lipman’s work was the centrality of two inter-related elements, namely critical 
thinking and communities of inquiry (Vansieleghem & Kennedy 2011; here we use the 
term ‘communities of inquiry’, while others prefer ‘community of philosophical 
inquiry’ (Kennedy 1999)). The coming together of critical thinking and communities 
of inquiry reminds us of the centrality of individual reasoning within a collective 
environment; indeed, this can be considered as the leitmotif of the Philosophy for 
Children movement (for an excellent overview of the place and nature of thinking 
within Philosophy for Children, see Lipman 1993). It is from the foundation of these 
elements—notably how they are constituted, at what they aim, and of what they are 
constitutive—that any differences within the field typically commence. This is 
evidenced in Lipman’s work in which critical thinking is represented as an active 
process acting against ill- and under-considered assumptions (Daniel & Auriac 2011, 
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p. 420). Further, Lipman understood that critical thinking is developed through a 
process of discursive interaction with others. By locating critical thinking as being 
generated through and by participation in discursive communities of inquiry, Lipman 
references a property which is individual (critical thinking as the ability to govern 
oneself) and a property which is communal (critical thinking as the ability to 
participate within a community). According to Pardales and Girod (2006, p. 306) a 
community of inquiry can be understood as involving dialogue about ‘topics of 
interest, in the service of constructing knowledge and common understanding, and 
internalising the discourse of the inquiring community’ (though it is not altogether 
clear whether the community is internal to the inquiry or, additionally, includes the 
wider communities within which inquiry is undertaken). This focus on community 
reminds us that Philosophy for Children is not solely concerned with critical 
thinking and reasoning, but is also concerned with the ways in which one (in this 
case the student) engages as a critical, creative and caring member of their 
communities. Lipman (1995, 2002) included caring thinking as a key element of his 
approach to Philosophy for Children while, in her commentary on Lipman’s work 
on Philosophy for Children, Vanseileghem  makes clear the connection to significant 
inter-personal, as well as intra-personal, dispositions and capacities: 
In brief, it can be said that Lipman’s programme is orientated towards 
objectives that are functional for intellectual development, logical thinking and 
empathy for others, as well as objectives that consist in the formation of 
participative, autonomous, responsible and respectful citizens. (2005, p. 22) 
Similarly, Sharp (1999) suggests that: 
The community of inquiry reflects democracy and initiates the children into the 
principles and values of this paradigm, it engages young generations in a 
process of individual and political growth … By exercising in school freedom 
of thought and action, democracy will become their way of living and being 
when they become active adults within their society. (p. 12) 
There is much in analyses such as this that is likely to be, at the very least, of interest 
to character educators, notably the focus on and connections between intellectual 
development, empathy for others, participative citizenship, and living and being. 
For us, this serves to  highlight that Philosophy for Children is concerned not only 
with students becoming certain types of thinkers, but also certain types of human 
beings, a line of thought we return to in the next section. 
 
Philosophy for Children and character education  Journal of Philosophy in Schools 2(2) 
53 
Character education 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a ‘revival’ in character education (Arthur 2003; Nash 
1997). A range of commentators in the US (Bennett 1993; Lickona 1991; Wynne 1982, 
1986)—and subsequently in Britain (Arthur 2003; Carr 1995, 1996; Wringe 1998)—
have contended that education should be concerned with the development of the 
character of students and, for this reason, that virtues should form the basis of 
school-based moral education. A central tenet of character education is that forms of 
moral education which focus solely on cognitive development provide an 
insufficient basis for real moral development, which requires the development of 
affection and action alongside cognition. There is insufficient scope to provide a 
detailed overview of the philosophical roots underpinning work on character within 
moral education, and this corpus is handled well elsewhere (see, for example, Arthur 
2003; Crittenden 1992). While we do not to diminish the importance of other moral 
and theological scholars—such as Cicero, Erasmus, Augustine, Aquinas, Montaigne 
and Rousseau—who have similarly sort to place character as central to moral 
development and/or education, following others (Arthur 2003; Carr 2008; 
Kristjánsson 2013) we draw predominantly on its Aristotelian roots. Indeed, 
Aristotle’s work has taken a central place in the renaissance of interest in virtues in 
moral philosophy through the work of scholars such as Elizabeth Anscombe (1958), 
Philippa Foot (1981), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). 
To a large extent, the character education movement can be understood as a reaction 
to the dominance of liberal-minded, cognitive development approaches to moral 
education that emphasised ‘process over content and critical autonomy over social 
interdependence’ (Arthur 2003, p. 27). Inter-related with theoretical 
conceptualisations of a virtue-based approach to moral education have been a 
number of practice-led character education programmes. Predominantly based in 
the US, such initiatives include the Character Institute 
(http://charactereducationinstitute.com/), the Character Education Partnership 
(http://www.character.org/) and Character Counts (http://charactercounts.org/). The 
latter bases its educational policies and practices around its Six Pillars of Character: 
trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring and citizenship. More 
recently a large-scale research centre focused on character, virtues and values has 
been established at the University of Birmingham, England. The Jubilee Centre for 
Character and Virtues works to promote ‘a moral concept of character in order to 
explore the importance of virtue for public and professional life’ and defines 
character as: 
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encompass[ing] the morally evaluable, reason-responsive, and educable part of 
human personality, and we understand virtues as states of character concerned 
with morally praiseworthy feelings and conduct in specific spheres of human 
life. (www.jubileecentre.ac.uk) 
As was suggested in the introduction, whilst we accept that the nature of character 
education is open to a number of interpretations we are interested in forms of the 
movement that recognise that character conjoins affective and cognitive domains, 
and in doing so relates thinking, feeling and action. Clearly, there are some 
important differences between the fields of Philosophy for Children and character 
education which, whilst not our primary focus here, should not be ignored 
completely. Whilst Philosophy for Children is interested primarily in the processes 
which make moral reasoning possible, character education’s interest is 
fundamentally on outcomes in terms of the development of individuals’ character. 
Further, the two fields, for example, draw on different theoretical roots. Whilst the 
latter takes its essence primarily from Aristotelian roots (and from contemporary 
interpretations thereof), philosophy for children draws on a range of influences. 
Daniel and Auriac (2011, p. 418) point to the influence of a range of twentieth 
century American philosophers such as ‘Robert Ennis, Matthew Lipman, Richard 
Paul, John McPeck and Harvey Siegel’, whilst Golding (2011, p. 413), with particular 
regard to communities of inquiry, cites the influence of John Dewey, CS Peirce, Lev 
Vygotsky, GH Mead, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jürgen Habermas (see also Lipman 
1993 for a range of accounts of the philosophical basis of Philosophy for Children).  
Such differences, however, are not complete binaries, but rather are complex and 
blurred. Furthermore, any serious approach to moral education must take account of 
how cognition, feeling and action interact—something which is of interest to 
educators in both fields. To be able to reason and use one’s ‘moral imagination’ 
(Johnson 1993, p. 198) is a necessary condition of moral learning (indeed, it would 
seem hard to countenance any approach to moral learning that viewed reasoning as 
unimportant), but is not in and of itself sufficient. Without emotional commitment, 
reason remains somewhat abstract and partial, lacking a commitment to moral 
action. As Sprod suggests: 
When we are committed to our thinking, it is because of the emotions that 
underpin it. Without any emotion, there would be no commitment. And 
without any commitment, there would be no reason for thinking rather than 
not thinking, or for thinking this way rather than that. (2001, p. 23) 
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The point that moral learning should involve a combination of thinking, feeling and 
action is not simply a philosophical one, with evidence suggesting that schools are 
often involved in developing students’ values through a variety (rather than one 
singular) method. Indeed, the Values in Australian Education project found that whilst 
‘it may not have been overt in the reports they prepared, many of the schools and 
clusters involved in the study … often seek some sort of synthesis’ between 
cognitive-developmental and character based approaches, and that ‘such a synthesis 
is arguably supported by the strong empirical indications that the adoption of 
different teaching and learning approaches is much more effective than the adoption 
of a single approach in isolation’ (Department for Education, Science and Training 
2003, p. 35). 
Given this, and the interest which the fields of Philosophy for Children and character 
education have received over the last four decades, it is somewhat surprising that 
there has been so little discussion regarding the potential for commensurability 
between Philosophy for Children and character education (see Sprod 2001 for a 
notable exception). Our aim in the sections which follow is to begin to address this 
gap. 
 
Cultivating intellectual virtues 
It was suggested in the introduction that whilst some critiques of character 
education view the field as necessarily anti-intellectual and conformist, this 
conception is mistaken. A typical example of this misrepresentation is the stance 
adopted by Robert Nash, who has argued that  
character educators go too far in separating moral reasoning from moral 
conduct. The result is to foster an ethos of compliance in schools wherein 
indoctrination and rote-learning replace critical reflection and autonomous 
decision-making. (1997, p. 30) 
Nash’s argument strikes an important chord with regard to seeking greater clarity 
about the function and nature of critical reason within character education. Indeed, 
as Nash points out: 
Aristotle teaches that we need to appeal to reason to locate an individual’s 
particular telos as well as the universal logos (an ultimate rational power). 
Mimesis is not always enough. While the character educators talk often of 
‘habituation’ and of fostering a ‘disposition’ towards virtuous conduct, they 
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speak far less frequently of the function of critical reason in living a virtuous life. 
(1997, p. 40, emphasis in original) 
However, and as Sprod reminds us, learning through habituation requires some 
degree of critical reasoning if it is to be learning at all (rather than, say, repetition 
without progress), while ‘unthinking habituation’ makes no moral distinction 
between context and situations, and therefore moves students ‘away from ethical 
behaviour’ (2001, p. 103, emphasis in original). Once the confluence highlighted here 
between reason and habituation is accepted, there are clear grounds for claiming that 
no prima facie reasons exist as to why programmes of character education are 
necessarily and ex vi termini anti-intellectual. Properly constituted character education 
programmes are anything but anti-intellectual—interested in intellectual 
development rather than intellectual conditioning (Kristjánsson 2013). As Arthur 
(2003, p. 40) suggests, the ‘cultivation of virtue does not mean the abandonment of 
rationality – it simply provides a moral setting for the exercise of reasoning’. The 
questions remain, however, (i) how such intellectual development is best understood 
within character education, and (ii) whether the sort of intellectual development 
central to character education can be reasonably understood to be broadly 
commensurable with the sorts of critical thinking central to Philosophy for Children. 
Let us consider each of these in turn. 
Those character educationalists who have been explicit about the role of intellectual 
growth typically posit it as occurring within particular communities and as 
operating interactively with the development of moral feelings and action. Indeed, 
the location of moral development in relation to the community (whether that of the 
classroom, the school or the wider neighbourhood) is a recurring and central theme 
within character education (Cochran 1982; Popenoe 1995; Strike 2008). Jonathan 
(1999) suggests the importance of relating individual moral learning with 
communities in the following way: 
to develop in the young the capacity for critical reflection on values cannot in 
and of itself provide an adequate framework either for the development of 
individual commitments or for the shared social understandings that both 
shape and reflect commitments. Indeed, the rationale for such reflection in 
individuals presupposes the exercise of a surrounding framework of value that 
both supports and sustains, and against which personal values are elaborated 
and modified. (p. 64) 
In other words, students’ character development does not occur within a vacuum 
but rather takes place with reference to, and through participation within, the 
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various communities in which they are located and embedded (Strike 2008). For this 
reason, education of, and for, character is dynamic and multi-dimensional. Arthur 
(2003) further illustrates the importance of community in relation specifically to 
cognitive aspects of character development, providing the example of students’ 
individual intellectual development as working interdependently with, and within, 
the wider school community. By considering their own values and virtues within 
such a context, students’ moral attachments, dispositions and understandings are 
given context and meaning: 
if a school identifies and promotes habituation in virtue as providing 
sustenance for the school community, its students will find it easier to reflect 
upon and modify their thinking and behaviour, rather than merely 
emphasising (even self-chosen) rules to which individual actions must 
conform. (p. 32) 
But what, specifically, are the intellectual properties which are being developed? 
While most character educators place their primary focus on the development—
through habituation—of moral action and its connection to the intellectual virtue of 
phronesis, there has more recently been a turn within the field toward ‘intellectual’ 
virtues. Intellectual virtues represent 
the personal qualities or character traits of a good thinker or a good learner … 
They are a matter of will and of related psychological states like attitudes, 
beliefs, desires, and feelings. (Baehr 2013b) 
This explicit focus on intellectual character draws on recent work within the field of 
‘virtue epistemology’, a field of epistemology which Pritchard (2013, p. 236) 
describes as ‘arguably the dominant viewpoint in contemporary epistemology’. 
Intellectual virtues can be viewed as ‘traits that flow from and are anchored in a 
desire for or commitment to epistemic goods’ (Baehr 2013b). For Kotzee (2013): 
[R]ather than focusing on what the knower knows, virtue epistemology turns 
its attention to the knower him/herself. The question, for virtue epistemology, 
is not so much what knowledge is as what it is to be a good knower. (p. 159) 
This recent work in the field of virtue epistemology has sought to restate the 
centrality of intellectual dispositions, typically citing their normative properties. This 
work, of course, has its roots in the classical work of Aristotle whom, in his original 
formulation, presented five intellectual virtues required for critical thinking: wisdom 
(sophia), scientific knowledge (episteme), reason (nous), practical wisdom (phronesis), 
and craft or skill knowledge (techne). For Aristotle, intellectual virtues are entities in 
Philosophy for Children and character education  Journal of Philosophy in Schools 2(2) 
58 
their own right and represent important elements of character necessary for sound 
reasoning and judgement. However, in the central virtue of phronesis – practical 
wisdom – the intellectual becomes intertwined with the moral; that is, the 
intellectual virtue of phronesis plays an essential role in mediating, informing and 
enacting moral virtue (Kristjánsson 2014). This view is central to Aristotelian 
understandings of character education, and are based on the premise that the ‘key to 
the development of the full virtue for which moral habituation could only provide 
the foundation l[ies] in the cultivation of the particular form of reason or 
deliberation’ characterised by phronesis (Carr 2008, p. 115). In other words, it is 
within and through phronesis that correct thinking, feeling and conduct are applied. 
Indeed, it is the capacity to arrive cognitively at right decisions about how to act and 
feel that enables one to live the good life so conceived (Kristjánsson 2014). 
The identification (or strictly speaking the re-identification, given its roots in 
Aristotle) of intellectual virtues as operating alongside and as—in phronesis—
importantly related to moral virtues has an educational significance concerning the 
nature of moral learning and its cognitive elements. This significance is illustrated by 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1967) when he argues that: 
We … exhibit rationality in two kinds of activity: in thinking, where reasoning 
is what constitutes the activity itself; and in such activities other than thinking 
where we may succeed or fail in obeying the precepts of reason. The 
excellences of the former Aristotle calls the intellectual virtues; of the latter, the 
moral virtues … intellectual virtue is the consequence usually of explicit 
instruction, moral of habit. (p. 64) 
It is in and through this combination of intellectual and moral development that an 
education in the virtues moves beyond the mere conditioning and indoctrination 
attributed by its critics, and in doing so opens the possibilities for the expression and 
development of an individual’s personal and unique character (Kaplan, 1995; 
Arthur, 2003). The sorts of intellectual virtues which their contemporary proponents 
have in mind are represented in the following list from Baehr (2013b), which also 
includes the sorts of intellectual vices which are to be avoided: 
… curiosity, wonder, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual 
thoroughness, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual autonomy, 
intellectual courage, and intellectual humility. Intellectual vices … [include] 
dogmatism, bias, intellectual hastiness, closed-mindedness, intellectual 
carelessness, intellectual superficiality, and intellectual arrogance. (emphasis in 
original) 
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There is a clear sense in which intellectual virtues relate to the sorts of actions 
familiar to educational practice, finding expression in ‘thinking, reasoning, 
interpreting, analysing, reflecting, questioning, and so on’ (Baehr 2013a, p. 255). 
Indeed, the sorts of intellectual virtues described by Baehr are very similar to the 
critical thinking skills identified as being central to Philosophy for Children. Daniel 
and Auriac (2011), for example, highlight the centrality of the following within 
Philosophy for Children: 
… complex cognitive skills (to elucidate, examine, review, discriminate, 
distinguish, evaluate, criticize, etc.) and predispositions (curiosity, open-
mindedness towards others, thoroughness, acceptance of criticism, etc.) that are 
related to critical thinking. (p. 415) 
Whether framed in terms of reason or critical thinking, these intellectual capacities 
are fundamental to many of the educational initiatives within the Philosophy for 
Children community. SAPERE claim that Philosophy for Children results in ‘notable 
increases in respect, open-mindedness, reasoning and reasonableness—in and out of 
the classroom’ (www.sapere.co.uk). The Federation of Australasian Philosophy in 
Schools Associations suggests that the movement  
encourages the development of a collaborative and inquiring classroom 
community. It cultivates useful intellectual and social habits, such as careful 
listening, imaginative and critical thinking, clear communication and empathy. 
(FAPSA 2011) 
Furthermore, and as the statements  from leading organisations suggest, it is 
important to recognise that Philosophy for Children goes beyond the development 
of critical thinking and reason, and extends to the development of wider attributes 
and dispositions. This is encapsulated in the following: 
Whilst it is true that philosophy for children does improve students’ critical 
and creative thinking skills, calling it a ‘thinking skills’ programme does not do 
it justice. It does much more as well … Philosophy for children builds on the 
students’ own wonder and curiosity about ideas that are vitally important to 
them. The subject matter of Philosophy for Children is those common, central 
and contestable concepts that underpin both our experience of human life and 
all academic disciplines. Examples of such concepts are: Truth, reality, 
knowledge, evidence, freedom, justice, goodness, rights, mind, identity, love, 
friendship, rules, responsibility, action, logic, language, fairness, reason, 
existence, possibility, beauty, meaning, self, time, God, infinity, human nature, 
thought. (Philosophy for Children New Zealand n.d.-a) 
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It is worth reflecting, however, as to whether the two fields might be understood as 
embracing a different level of intellectual commitment and desire. The essence of 
this question lies in the extent to which what is being developed are intellectual 
virtues—permanent, deep-rooted behaviours and dispositions—as opposed to 
particular skills which the student can demonstrate (or not) without a concomitant 
desire to do so; that is, the development not only of a skill but of rational capacity 
and a desire in one’s will to make use of it appropriately. The argument we are 
seeking to make here about the educational importance of differentiating between 
intellectual skills on the one hand and intellectual virtues on the other borrows from 
a critique of contemporary morality offered by Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) when he 
suggests that: 
what the morality of the virtues articulated in and defended by the moral 
rhetoric of our political culture provides is, it turns out, not an education in the 
virtues but, rather, an education in how to seem virtuous, without actually 
being so. (p. 131) 
The key here is the extent to which (to paraphrase from MacIntyre) an education in 
intellect is one that focuses on how to act intellectually without actually being so. 
That is, whether it is possible for a student to demonstrate intellectual skills without 
actually possessing any intellectual virtues. We contend that this can be helpfully 
illustrated in the following example regarding reflection/evaluation.  
Many experiential educational programmes include student reflection/evaluation as 
a key component. Typically, these require students to consider an event, action or 
task in which they have been involved and to analyse what happened, why it 
happened, its benefits, its costs, and, crucially, how such reflection might usefully 
inform further experience/practice. Let’s assume that two students—Student A and 
Student B—have provided a written response in an examination, and that this is 
being assessed by someone who knows nothing else about the students involved 
other than the information contained in their responses (owing to the anonymity of 
the marking process). Student A is an engaged, focused student whose level of 
academic attainment is low, but who has actively sought to improve their inter- and 
intra-personal skills, has reflected well throughout the process, and has tried, not 
wholly successfully, to convey this in their response. Student B is not engaged in the 
subject or the activity, but has a strong aptitude for written responses, and is 
knowledgeable about the key terminology and sorts of language employed within 
reflective writing. As such, Student B is able to write a long and extensive answer 
about the ways in which they were reflective throughout the task and how they 
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learned from this process. In fact, Student B feels that they have not learned from the 
process, but is aware that writing this will seriously limit the mark they receive for 
this question. Clearly, there is a difference here in the extent to which Student A and 
Student B can respectively be said to possess the intellectual virtue of reflection. 
Whilst one may ask wider questions regarding the validity of the examination 
system and task involved (one would want to ask these, but the example described 
was a common one across a number of subjects until recently in the GCSE 
qualifications in England), crucial for our analysis here is whether the student in 
question is a reflective person expressing the virtue of being reflective, or merely 
demonstrating the sorts of language required by the reflective genre; that is, has each 
student really been reflective and will this have an applicability and value which 
transcends their participation in other activities? For Student B, certainly not. 
The essence of our suggestion here is that, in the cases of both Student A and 
Student B, it would seem evident that both students have developed and displayed 
some form of cognitive skills or capacity and that, on certain measures of 
assessment, both students have displayed this skill or capacity through their work. 
The difference lies, therefore, in the extent to which one of the students (in our 
illustration, Student A) can be said to have integrated the trait in question—being 
reflective—within their character and, in doing so, has moved beyond displaying 
cognitive skills to possessing an intellectual virtue. As such, our contention is that 
while cognition forms a key part of intellectual virtues, cognition is not in and of 
itself a necessary and sufficient condition, with virtue requiring a concomitant desire 
to enact the virtue within one’s actions. It would seem to us that there is potential for 
some useful further investigation to take place across the fields regarding the 
internalisation and enactment of intellectual capacities/virtues. 
 
Moral action 
Drawing on the work of Aristotle, exponents of character education have typically 
focused on the centrality of moral action; that is, the development of students’ acting 
in accordance with the virtues. It is this aretaic commitment that underpins and 
explains the educational importance which character educators place, in turn, on 
habituation. Indeed, habituation can be seen as representing the core educational 
practice in the development of character. Citing the recent work of Gregory (2000), 
Vanseileghem (2005) and Schertz (2007), we suggested above that by pointing to 
emotional capacities such as care and empathy, as well as the exercising of 
responsible and participative citizenship, writers within the field of Philosophy of 
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Children have also been interested in the affective and experiential. In this section 
we take this focus one step further, and consider the extent to which Philosophy for 
Children takes seriously the connection between the cognitive, the affective, and the 
experiential in relation to moral action.  
In his exposition of philosophical inquiry in classrooms, Fisher (1998, p. 10) notes 
that ‘[A] fully participative democratic society requires an autonomous citizenry that 
can think, judge and act for themselves’ (emphasis added). Of particular interest and 
importance here is the work of Ann-Margaret Sharp, one of the founders of the 
Philosophy for Children movement. In her article Philosophy for Children and the 
development of ethical values Sharp (1995, p. 49) lists examples of the ethical tools or 
procedures which children need to be taught with regard to their ethical inquiry. 
These include ‘citing reasons for opinions or actions’, ‘utilizing criteria or standards’, 
‘defining terms’, and ‘investigating underlying ethical assumptions’. Sharp 
continues ‘These tools are not self-sufficient. They require being supplemented with 
virtuous dispositions on the part of the students’. Sharp talks in terms of Philosophy 
for Children encouraging: 
the formation of community feelings, which develop the pro-social virtuous 
dispositions (such as sincerity, courage, care, honesty, considerateness, 
compassion, sensitivity, integrity etc.) and character structures of the children 
in the class. (1995, p. 49) 
It might be useful here to draw out two potential ways in which Philosophy for 
Children might prepare students for action, both of which have connections to the 
focus on habituation and service central to character education programmes. The 
first way is to conceive of Communities of Inquiry as participative forums in their 
own right; that is, mechanisms for students to actively cultivate and express moral 
character as well as exhibiting their cognitive development. It is this sense of 
community which Sharp (1995, p. 49) has in mind when she suggests that ‘the 
community of inquiry provides a social dimension in which the bonds that connect 
students can be strengthened and their understanding of moral philosophy can be 
clarified’. 
The second way is to conceive of Communities of Inquiry as forums for reflection 
about and on actions which occur within other environments (the school, the family, 
the community etc.). In this sense, the Community of Inquiry becomes an essential 
element of a process of active and experiential learning. This is hinted at within the 
aims of Philosophy for Children identified by Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1980), 
according to whom its purpose ‘is to help them become more thoughtful, more 
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reflective, more considerate, and more reasonable individuals’ and that, as a result, 
students will ‘not only have a better sense of when to act but also of when not to act’ (p. 
15, emphasis added). 
In both of these conceptions the relationship between individual and societal 
formations comes into focus. For some proponents of cognitive development the 
strong commitment to individual reasoning means that its relation to wider 
communities and societies may be neglected. Daniel and Auriac (2011), for example, 
cite the importance of Richard Paul’s principle of ‘strong sense critical thinking’ 
which involves not only reflection and critical thinking, but also posits as crucial that 
individuals’ ‘beliefs are their own constructions rather than the result of absorption of 
society’s beliefs and prejudices’ (p. 419, emphasis added). Paul’s principle wrongly 
presupposes that an individual’s construction can ever fully be their own, produced 
in a vacuum. Rather, an individual’s construction represents an interplay between 
society’s norms and values and how these are incorporated into the particular and 
specific character of the individual. Daniel and Auriac recognise this when they 
suggest that the sort of critical thinking involved within philosophy for children is 
not concerned with ‘simply initiating students to the standards, rules, laws and 
traditions of their culture, but that it consists of encouraging students to embrace 
them in a critical manner’ (2011, pp. 421-422). For this reason, a community of 
inquiry does not only represent a ‘micro-society’ as Daniel and Auraic (2011, p.  422) 
suggest, but also (ideally) a microcosm of the communities within which students 
live and participate. Moreover, this recognition does not in and of itself mean that a 
student’s individuality—their individual character—becomes indistinguishable from 
those of others or the collective whole. As Arthur (2003, p. 29) reminds us, ‘Virtues 
are chosen and acquired because they have the capacity to help us become the 
person we ought to become, but we remain unique individuals and characters even 
if we acquire exactly the same virtues as others’. 
 
The confluence of P4C and character education? Some implications for moral 
education 
In this last section we explore some tentative implications for moral education of the 
sorts of connections between Philosophy for Children and character education which 
we have sought to draw here. We focus on three which are of particular significance. 
The first implication is the need to recognise the integral relationship between individual 
and collective reasoning in any form of moral education. This recognition is central to 
models of communities of inquiry (Sprod 2001). Within communities of inquiry the 
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role of the teacher is central for, as Millett and Tapper (2012, p. 547) suggest, 
‘guidance from the teacher helps the students to build a constructive dialogue in 
which concepts are clarified, meanings are explored and where through a process of 
dialectic a shared understanding is achieved’. As they are typically presented within 
the field of Philosophy for Children, communities of inquiry are interested in (i) the 
processes through which individual and collective moral cognition occurs; (ii) the 
outcomes of moral thinking and discussion; as well as, potentially and importantly, 
(iii) the relationships between intellectual and moral cognition, affection, and action. 
We have touched on each of these three facets of communities of inquiry in various 
degrees of depth throughout our analysis so far. This said, while we take the first 
assertion—that communities of inquiry are interested in the processes through 
which individual moral cognition occurs—to be unproblematic, it is worth briefly 
explaining the second and third assertions. 
In suggesting that communities of inquiry are interested in the outcomes of moral 
thinking and discussion, we concur with Kennedy (1999, p. 346) that the forms of 
dialogue central to communities of inquiry are characterised by their fluidity, 
dynamism and emergent nature and in this sense ‘the path of dialogue is both found 
and constructed’. Moreover, and in relation to the third assertion that communities 
of inquiry are also interested in the relationships between intellectual and moral 
cognition, affection and action (Gregory 2000; Schertz 2007; Sprod 2001), it is 
important that teachers provide opportunity for students to inquire, feel and act as 
part of a simultaneous learning process. As Gregory (2000, p. 458) suggests, this 
would mean that teachers and students consider, reflect on and experience moral 
conduct and moral strategies ‘with a view to becoming proficient in them and to 
developing them into habits’. 
The second implication we would like to draw is the need to recognise the 
contextual import of any issues, values and virtues subject to moral discussion. 
Moral discussion, and the issues, values and virtues which make them possible, take 
place within a given context. In other words, they do not occur in isolation from 
school, familial, neighbourhood, community, and society, but in fact are shaped and 
influenced by these contexts. So too, the actors (in this case students) engaged in 
moral discussions are themselves influenced by (and to some extent themselves 
influence) the contexts into which they operate. Independence in thinking and action 
should not be understood as that which is an individual property, but rather as the 
thinking and action of an individual which recognises and accounts for contextual 
influences in a critical manner. 
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The third implication stems from recognition that properly constituted moral 
education programmes include cognitive, affective and volitional elements and as 
such bring together the features of both Philosophy for Children and character 
education. This concern is illustrated in the following comment from the leading 
democratic theorist Amy Gutmann: 
People adept at logical reasoning who lack moral character are sophists of the 
worst sort … But people who possess sturdy moral character without a 
developed capacity for reasoning are ruled only by habit and authority … 
Education in character and in moral reasoning are therefore both necessary, 
neither sufficient, for creating democratic citizens. (1987, p. 51) 
Similar concerns are reflected in two central pedagogical approaches for the teaching 
philosophy in schools identified by UNESCO (2007 and cited by Millett and Tapper 
2011, p. 549) as central to collaborative philosophical inquiry: 
 The democratic and discussionary paradigm—Here as well the aim is problem-
solving. What is different is the attempt to link the goal of learning to think 
for onself to democratic objectives … The idea is that for democracy as a 
political system to mature, it needs to have a thinking citizenry, that is to say, 
citizens with critical minds who can avoid the excesses of which democracy is 
always capable: doxology, majority rule, sophistry, persuasion by any means, 
demagoguery, and similar’; and, 
 The decision-making (praxeological) and ethical paradigm—‘this concerns learning 
to act, and not to solely think, in order to live well and in accordance with 
values. Doing philosophy involves consciously adopting a certain ethical 
conduct’. 
The democratic and discussionary paradigm and the decision-making and ethical 
paradigm relate in important ways to both Philosophy for Children and character 
education. It would seem to us that there is much to be gained from further and 
deeper reflection and research into how the two paradigms might provide fertile 
ground for strengthening the connections between the two fields. 
 
Conclusion 
Considering the connections between Philosophy for Children and character 
education is analytically important. Through the tentative analysis we have offered, 
we have suggested that there are areas of confluence between Philosophy for 
Children and character education that are philosophically and practically interesting. 
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Central to these connections is the inter-relationship between cognition, affection 
and action in moral learning, and the development of both intellectual and moral 
virtues. We have suggested that a necessary prerequisite for attaining such learning 
is to afford importance to the dynamic relationship between the education of the 
individual moral agent and the moral communities within which they live and act. 
Finally, here, we would also like to suggest also that more work needs to be done to 
consider the relationships between the community of inquiry approaches central to 
Philosophy in Schools and teaching approaches that seek to develop young peoples’ 
character and virtues. Such work is necessary not only to provide a more developed 
awareness of the two fields, but also to provide a prism through which to view and 
understand the sorts of moral education which takes place in schools.  
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